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CHAPTER I 
ARISTOTLE'S THEORY OF PLEASURE 
. 
The purpose of this first ehapte~ f~ merely aa introductory de-
lineation of the theory ot pleasure earefUlly worked out DY Aristotle. l 
The adTaBtage of this initial analysis will consist in ,iTln, us a ~ais 
.. 
tor plotting the theory of Plato. The souroes for the doctrine of Plato 
are scattered, diffieult to interpret and reconcile. The opiBion of 
." 
Aristotle is more eonoise ani compact. The thesis of Aristotle is treat.d 
in, to a .efiniti •• of pleasure ana its jUBtitioatioa. Tke wkele 
Aristotelian d~soussio. of pleasure, aoreOTer, ooeupie. a particular plao. 
in his well-pl ... e. ethies an. thus eaaDles the student of his thought to 
judge more easily the ethical value of pleasure in hi. Boheme ot lito. 
Ari.totle's iiscussion of pleasuro may De diTiiei into two mai. 
parts, a negatiTe &ad a positiTo.2 In tke negatiTe seetion he considers 
the arguments of two elasses of thought and estiaatin, their value he 
iraw. his own ooaolusien trom their arcume.ts. By treati~ his o,po ••• te 
aDd are enabled to comprehe.i moro fully the explaaatioB of his staa •• 
1 Aristotle's theory of pleasure is taken from Book X ot the NichGaaoheaa 
Ethics. 
2 A.J. Festugiere, Ari.tote: Le Plai.ir, BiDlietheque de. Texte. Phile-
sopkiques, Liaraire PailespiTque J. Vria, Paris, 1936, xx. 
I 
2 
.' The exponent of the first olass 0 f thought is Eudoxus, who prese:b.ts 
two arguments, whioh maintain the thesis that pleasure is the Sovereign Good, 
f~ ~f'~TOV, and so beoomes the ultimate aim of all our aotions in 1ife.3 
Without displaying the arguments, since they ~re the subjeot of objeotions 
offered by the seoond class of opponents disoussed by Aristotle, we may 
hurriedly dismiss Eudoxus as does Aristotle himself. Aristotle is willing to 
aooept the premises of Eudoxus' arguments, but ,praws from tilem a more moderate 
oonolusion. The arguments do not prove that pleasure is identified with the 
Supreme Good, and, therefore, is not the final end of life, but they merely 
demonstrate that pleasure must be oonsidered as a good. Fundamentally in 
agreement with Eudoxus, in so ~ar as he accepts the premises of the arguments, 
Aristotle passes quickly to ~he more serious refutation of the second group 
of adversaries. 
The arguments of the second class of thought Aristotle treats with 
greater care and detail.4 Evidently, he considers them of more importance .... 
The arguments, though in the tenth book of the Nichomachean Ethics they are 
not stated as belonging to any definite man or group, may be identified with 
the thesis and proofs of the Platonic school headed by Speusippus. Their 
contention is that pleasure far from being the Supreme Good is not a good 
at all. 
3 Aristotle, Ethica Nichomachea, translated by W.D. Ross, IX. Works of 
Aristotle, edited by W.D. Ross, 11 vols. Clarendon Press, Oxford:-
1172 b 10-25. 
4 Ibid., 1172 b 35. 
f 
........ ~ 
------------------------------------------------~3~ 
.' Aristotle makes short work of Speusippus' first two arguments, 
which are treated in the manner of two objections to the proofs Eudoxus 
presented in the defense of his thesis. Speusippus objects that, "that at 
which all things aim is not necessarily g~od .• " 5 Aristotle dismisses him 
.. t4; 
with disdain. That is nonsense. If the animals alone sought after pleas-
ure the point might be maintained, but not when "intelligent creatures do 
so as well."6 st. Thomas in commenting on t~s section of the Ethics 
succinctly puts it: "quia non est possibile quod naturale judicium in omni-
bus fallatur."7 
Speusippus attacks the second argwaent ot contraries, asserting 
that if pain is an evil and an object of aversion, it does not follow that 
pleasure must be good and an object of choke. A faot of common experience 
is the basis of Aristotle's response to this. Speusippus wishes pain to 
have for its contrary another evil, which he oonsiders to be pleasure; and 
pain and pleasure would be opposed to one another as the very great is to* 
the very little. But pleasure, then, would have to be an objeot of aver-
sion just as pain and it is manifest that people avoid pain as an evil, and 
make pleasure the object of their ohoice. Therefore it is good. 
Aristotle oontinues his opposition to the doctrine of Speusippus 
by breaking down his objeotions. However, the remaining objections of 
5 Ibid., 1172 b 35. 
6 Ibid., 1173 a 5. 
7 St. Thomas Aquinas, In X Libros Ethicorum ad Niohomachum, XXI. Opera 
Omnia, 25 vols. Typ:rs-Petrilfiaccadori, 1Jr66, Lib. X, lect7 II, 330 b. 
4 
.' speusippus are leveled at arguments independent of the proofs ot Eudoxus. 
Pleasure, the adversary claims, is not a good, because good per-
tains to the genus ot quality, but pleasure is not a quality. Aristotle 
denies the conclusion that therefore it tQI~ows that pleasure is not good, 
because happiness itself and the other forms of virtue are not qualities. 
The argument proTes too much. It is further pointed out by st. Thomas in 
his commentary: "Bonum enim dicitur non sol~in qualitate sed etiam in 
omnibus generibus."8 
Speusippus further persists that good 1s determined, while 
pleasure is unlimited, for it admits ot degrees. By making use of a dis-
tinction Aristotle clears this hazard. Pleasure can be said to be more or 
less in a concrete subject, because the subject participates in the torm of 
pleasure more or less, but taken in the abstract pleasure 1s one and simple, 
eTen as the good, or justice or any ot the other virtues. In this sense 
there is no question ot degree. ~ 
By reducing pleasure to a movement or generation Speusippus hopes 
to uphold his point, for movement or generation is imperfect and this 
hinders pleasure from being the good, which is perfect. For his answer 
Aristotle makes use ot his doctrine on motion already treated in the 
Physics. Motion and generation require time for their oompletion and by 
reason of this they are termed imperfect, but pleasure is like ~ision, it 
does not require time, in an instant it is accomplished. Pleasure must be 
8 Ibid., Lib. X, lect. III, 332 a. 
~-···----------------------------------~I 5 
.' viewed as a whole. oomplete at every instant. It is maintained. of oourse, 
that "pain is a laok of that whioh is aooording to nature and pleasure is 
the replenishment,"9 but all generation supposes a oommon subjeot. Aooord-
ing to Speusippus this is the body. In this he is mistaken. for that whioh 
.. .. , 
feels pleasure is not the body, but the soul. There is a oonfusion, there-
fore, between the restoration of the natural state and pleasure, whioh re-
sults thereby. MDreover, it is olear that tht objection restricts the 
generality of pleasures to one single species, namely, the corporal 
pleasures, for the examples ot pleasure and pain are those conneoted with 
nutrition. There are many of the other pleasures, tor instance, the 
pleasures of learning, whioh presuppose no pain and theretDre are not oon-
nected with a replenishment. 
The final objection reters to the displaying ot the disgraoeful 
pleasures as a proot that pleasure is not good. It may be denied simply 
that these so-oalled pleasures are really pleasant, for things are not .~ 
sweet or bitter to those suffering from a vitiated taste, nor can white-
ness be attributed to those things which seem to be so to a person suffer-
ing trom a disease of the eye. No more should we consider as pleasures f 
those which seem to be pleasant to one of a vioious oonstitution. It may 
be further answered that. although all pleasures are desirable, yet not in 
every case. To be wealthy is a good thing. but not When it requires the 
9 Ross. 1173 b 5. 
6 
.' betrayal of our ideals, or again, health is a good thing, but not if it re-
quires eating everything. They are pleasures, but not by reason of these 
souroes. There are various speoies of pleasure. Some are derived from 
noble souroes, some from base sources. One wpo is not just oannot ex-
perienoe the pleasure proper to the just, and the same applies to the 
pleasures of musio and the others. 
To conclude the negative seotion of ~s treatise Aristotle submits 
three proofs that pleasure is not in itself and universally good. 
Pleasures, depending upon their souroes, belong to diverse species, of whioh 
certain ones are good, others are bad. An illustration of this is the 
pleasure, which oomes from the praise of a friend and that from the praise 
of a flatterer. Secondly, though the pleasures of ohildhood are many and 
wonderful, one would scarcely desire to go through his whole life with the 
mind of a child, nor even if pain were never to be our lot as a result, 
would we choose the pleasures which arise from disgraoeful aotions. 
Finally, ·there are some things which men would be eager for, even granting 
that no pleasure is attached to them, for example, seeing, remembering, 
knowing, and having virtue. "Id autem quod est per se bonum, tale est, sine f 
quo nihil est eligibile, ut patet de felicitate."lO 
We have reached now the positive seotion of Aristotle's dis-
• 
cU8sion, whioh is the more important, because of his valuable and permanent 
contributions to the intrioate problem of pleasure. ll Aristotle enters 
10 St. Thomas, Lib. X, 1eot. IV, 335 b. 
11 Ross, 1174 a 10. 
7 
upon his own disquisition on pleasure by explaining .' its nature from whioh 
he for.mulates a definition and ooncludes to oertain properties. He then 
reveals how pleasures aocording to the difterence ot their operations ditter 
in kind or speoies and also in goodness or .b~dness. 
Pleasure is concerned with activity or operation. Hence, 
Aristotle begins by explaining what he means by pertect activity and tor his 
model he uses sensation. Sensation is the conjition ot a sense aoting in 
relation to something sensible, which is the objeot of the sense. Two 
things must be considered in sensation, the principle of the aotivity, which 
is the sense, and the sensible, which is the objeot of the operation. In 
order that the aotivity be perfect, both must be in good condition. Hence, 
actlvity is pertect when a sense which is in good condition acts in relation 
to the most exoellent of its objeots, or, to use Aristotlets own definition, 
"the best aotivity is that of the best-oonditioned organ in the relation to 
the finest of its objects. ft12 
Aristotle now shows that pleasure is the perfeotion ot ac-
tivity. We see that the same operation, which has just been defined as most 
pertect is also the most pleasant. "Ubicumque enim invenitur in aliquo cog- f 
nosoente operatio pertecta, ibi etiam invenitur operatio delectabilis."13 
., -
Not only in respect ot all the senses, but even in respect to thought and 
. 
oontempleation the most oomplete or perfeot is the most pleasant. It, 
theretore, the perfect aotivity is pleasant, the most perfeot is the most 
12 Ross, 1174 b 15. 
13 st. Thomas, Lib. X, lect. VI, 338 b. 
pleasant, it follows that activity, in so far as it is perfect, is·'pleasant. 
Pleasure is the perfection of activity or that whioh completes activitye 
But in what way does it complete a.cti vi ty? Health and the 
doctor, for example, are not the cause in e~ctly the same way of a man's 
being healthy. Health acts in the manner of a form, the doctor acts in the 
manner of an agent. Pleasure is akin to health in a similar way, for it 
completes activity as a form, while the sense~r the intellect well-disposed 
toward its most suitable object acts in the manner of an agent. "Delectatio 
perfici t operationem non efficienter· sed formali ter. ,,14. But there is 
also a two-fold formal perfection. One is intrinsic and constitutes the 
very essence of a thing, but the other is that which supervenes the thing 
already constituted in its own species and may be called extrinsio. 
Pleasure is not as a form intrinsic and constituting the essence of the ac-
tivity, but it supervenes as the bloom or beauty of youth, not existing, as 
it were, of the essence of youth, but as a certain consequent of the good ~ 
disposition of the oauses of youth. Pleasure likewise follows upon the 
good condition of the causes of activity. 
From the nature of pleasure now determined we may consider the 
three oonsequent properties disoussedby Aristotle. Pleasure will endure 
in any activity as long as the object be it sensible or intelligible is in 
a suitable or apt condition and the sense or intellect, the "causa agens," 
is working. The reason for this is that when both the aotive and passive 
factor remain in the same disposition and are related to each otaer in the 
14 Ibid., Lib. X, lect. VI, 339 a. 
f 
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same way the same effect also remains. .' 
But no pleasure can be oontinuous and it ia a fact of common 
experience that no one is actually oontinuously pleased. The reason for 
this lies in the fact that there is labor i~volved in the activity whioh 
pleasure completes. Our bodily organs, the neoessary instruments of 
aotivity, are changed from their good disposition by reason of the mo~ion. 
which is joined to aotivity. A sensitive op~tion is immediately pro-
duced by the oorporeal organ, an intelleotual operation works mediately 
through the sensitive powers. whioh are produoed by oorporeal organs. 
Continual activity breaks down the good oondition of the bodily organs and 
destroys the perfect activity and consequently pleasure. 
We see here also the reason why new things give greater 
pleasure. A new thing attracts more intense and attentive aotivity, which, 
of oourse, increases the pleasure in proportion. Afterwards. when an ao-
tivity becomes routine or accustomed the activity is more negligently per~ 
formed and the activity is less perfeot. Naturally the pleasure also 
deoreases. 
Lastly we may consider the appetibility of pleasure, why all f 
people seek after it. It is reasonab. that all Should desire pleasure, 
because there is in us all a natural desire to live. Life in its ultimate 
• perfection consists ina oertain activity. Pleasure being that which com-
plates or perfects activity, it neoessarily completes life itself, which 
all so greatly desire, and pleasure beoause of its connection becomes also 
an object of desire. 
10 
.' Aristotle suggests a doubt whether we choose pleasure for the 
sake of life, or life for the sake of pleasure. However, though pleasure 
and activity are so intimately wrapped together that there oannot be one 
'!i thout the other, yet activity seems to be ,prior to pleasure a.nd of pri-
;.;. 4; 
mary importance. Activity, and therefore, life, should be the principle 
object of desire.lS 
Having considered the nature of p l~sure and its conditions 
along with a brief discussion of some of the properties flowing from the 
nature, Aristotle proceeds to his last point, the differentiation of 
pleasures both as to kind and to goodness. 
We might accept it almost as a principle that those things which 
are different in kind are perfected or completed by perfections, which also 
differ in kind. Pleasure is a perfection of aotivity so that as aotivities 
differ in species so must the pleasures which are proper to them. Certain-
ly it is nsnifest that the activities of the intellect differ in kind fro .. 
the activities of the 'senses, and the senses themselves are differentiated 
from one another according to their objects and powers, which are the 
principles of the activities. And in respect to artificial activities we f 
see the same thing, for a painting, which is distinctive for its pleasing 
colors is different from a photograph, which is pleasing by reason of its 
faithfulness and clarity in exactly representing its objects. 
IS W.D. Ross, Aristotle, revised edition, Methuen and Co. Ltd., London, 1930· 
229. 

12 
.' to a good program on the radio destroys our aotivity of reading a serious 
book. From this and his other oonsiderations Aristotle believes that eaoh 
aotivity different in kind has pleasures proper to it whioh also differ in 
kind. 
We are prepared now for the last and most important disoussion. 
What pleasures are good and what pleasures are bad? What pleasures should 
be oonsidered proper to man? Of those that ~e thought to be good what 
kind of pleasure or what pleasure should man pursue? 
To answer these questions Aristotle returns again to the differ-
enoe of aotivities. They differ in respeot of goodness and desirability, 
so that some we should choose, others we should avoid, while still others 
might be said to be in a neutral state. Since every aotivity has its 
proper pleasure, then "the pleasure proper to a worthy activity is good and 
that proper to an unworthy activity is bad."l9 The goodness of the 
pleasures d~ends upon the goodness of the activity. 
Aristotle introduces here the question of a distinotion between 
the pleasures proper to activities and the pleasures proper to desires, 
also the distinction between the purity and impurity of the various f 
ple~sures, especially of the senses. We omit the discussion, for, 
interesting though it might be, it is of minor importance to our thesis. 
But what pleasure is proper to man? In the oase of the animals 
the question is easily decided by referring to the proper activities and 
19 Ibid., 1175 b 25. 
13 
functions of the various species of animal. ~!' But the case of man ~s more 
involved~ for what is a delight to some is real pain to others, although 
all men are of one and the same species. The reason appears to be that the 
activities and pleasures of the ani~~ls fol~ow upon their natural inclina-
tion, but the activities and pleasures of man spring from reason~ which is 
not determined to one course. We find~ therefore, the same things to some 
are painful and hateful, to others delightful;.and desirable. But just as 
in the matter of taste, sweet things do not appear the same to one suffer-
ing from a fever as to one who is healthy, so pleasures differ to those 
better or ~rse disposed or equipped with reason to judge. Since we abide 
by the healthy man's verdict in the matter of taste it is reasonable that 
the distinctly human pleasures should be those in which~he wise and 
virtuous man delights, because he possesses a more sane and sound reason 
and judgment. 
Virtue~ therefore, is the measure we should follow in all human. 
affairs and those are the true pleasures which seem so to the virtuous man. 
"If things he finds tiresome seem pleasant to someone, that is not to be 
wondered at; for men may be ruined and spoilt in many ways; but the things t 
are not pleasant, but only pleasant to these people and to people in this 
condi tion. ,,20 The pleasures which the virtuous man repudiates are not 
really pleasures at all. but only to t hose whose reason and appetite have 
been perverted. The pleasures which all confess are base are only 
pleasures to men corrupt. 
20 Ibid., 1176 a 20. 
~-. ----------------------------llr,I 
Aristotle thus concludes his treatise o.a the universal na~~re of 
pleasure. Sur;nning up, we ma~r say that pleasure ::::is the inseparable COID-
panion of activity. Pleasure ts not a norm rese .. ved to a particular type 
of life, but extends to every form of life. It <::)annot be claimed alone by 
the devotees of pleasure for such a life recogni:2:es only the pleasures of the 
body, 'which, if pleas'lres at all, are only so in a secondary way. Pleasure 
belongs to all life properly human, by which Ap.stotle means all virtuous 
life vmich being founded upon the exercise of vir-tue or good activity is in 
itself pleasant. 
lJow too we can see Aristotle's plan in breating of pleasure in his 
book of Ethics, which purposes to find the ult~ate end at which all our 
particular actions aim as their chief good. The end of human nature is 
happiness, an acti vi ty consisting, e.s Festigiere asserts in summing up his 
own treatise on Aristotle, in the "exercise of al 1 those virtues which make 
us truly men and in its essence happiness is the ~ull blossoming of our 
faculties properly human. 1121 Pleasure being, the inseparable companion of 
acti vi ty there exists a necessary link between pl-easure and the ultimate end 
of our life. To quote Festugiere again, "happine ss implies pleasure not only f 
because we cannot live without a certain amount 0=£ corporal pleasure, not 
only because pleasure is a helpful condition or a necessary accidental of 
h 22 appiness, but in virtue of the very nature of plE3asure. ff • Happiness is 
virtuous activity and this activity is necessaril~ completed by pleasure. 
2JFestugiere, LXI. 
Ibid., LX:r. 
.' 
CHAPTER II 
THE PROBLEM OF HEDONISM IN PLATO 
After the systematic treatment of Aristotle's theory of pleasure in 
the previous chapter it is possible that the remainder of the thesis may be a 
little disappointing. No such system will be jpund in Plato's writings, in 
fact,many have gone awry by trying to interpret Plato's doctrine in such 
fashion, fixing it according to definite lines of a system. l However, this 
is no fault in Plato. It is due to the riohness and variety of his thought 
and the oharacter of his writings. Plato was not content like Aristotle to 
express his mind in a colorless, philosophical style. Plato's ideas are 
always placed in a definite setting and atmosphere and worked out in a per-
sonal, human way. He has always been acclaimed as much as an artist and 
dramatist as a great thinker. 
Such a presentation has created difficulties, nevertheless, for 
the student of Plato's thought. One il forced to assemble Plato's ideas on 
a particular subjeot from diverse places and divest them of any partioular 
dramatio or stylistic value to reaoh the bedrock of his true thought. On 
the other hand, misinterpretations oan especially occur in Plato by 
divoroing any group of his words from their particular oontext, whioh'very 
often adds a distinot oolor and tone to his opinion. 
I A.E. Taylor, Plato ~ ~ ~ His Work, Dial Press Ino., New York, 
1936, 23. 
15 
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Just such difficulties beset this thesis. but we will at~empt to 
sift all of Plato's references to pleasure and set them down in an orderly 
fashion with the purpose of determining as accurately as possible what is 
Plato's theory of pleasure. 
The order of the treatment is to be based upon the clear-out 
outline which Aristotle follows in his exposition. namely. in this ohapter 
we shall disouss the negative side of Plato's jbeory. what pleasure is not. 
considering Plato's refutations of various opponents. In the following 
chapters the positive side of the doctrine will be explained. In the next 
chapter what pleasure is. its nature and variety. will be expounded. Finally 
we shall. in the last ohapter. examine the ethical value of pleasure in 
Plato's philosophy of life. 
It must be noted that it is not the intention of the thesis to 
make a comparison or judge the respective merits of the treatment of the sub-
ject by the two ancient and eminent philosophers. The purpose throughout ~ 
to set down the facts of Plato's theory without approving or disapproving of 
them. The advantage of having considered Aristotle's theory first is that it 
furnishes a touohstone for arranging and expounding Plato's theory. f 
The exposition of Plato's theory of pleasure will ~ based 
generally upon the ideas expressed in the Phi1ebus. the Republic, the 
Gorgias. the Protagoras. the Phaedo. and the Laws. 
In the dialogues in which Plato treats most fully the subject of 
pleasure there is only one opposing view. which Plato persists in refuting. 
His opponents hold that pleasure is identified with the good and therefore 
is to be sought after in all our aotions as the ultimate end of li~. So 
eager is Plato to combat and overthrow this doctrine that he seems to spend 
his energy in arguing in this negative fashion, rather than in explaining 
positively his own view, which, however, is ~plioitly contained. The en-
• 4"" 
tire Gorgias, one of Plato's longer dialogues, is nothing but a vigorous ob-
jection to the hedonistio principle of life. However, since pleasure was the 
motive foroe for the aotions of the people of ~e street and Sophists by 
their own admission, or by the ultimate reduction of their prinoiples were 
exponents of Hedonism, Plato's vigorous opposition was justified. 
A oomparatively early mention in Plato of the ethioal doctrine of 
pleasure occurs in the dialogue, Gorgias.' Gorgias himselt is introduoed into 
t~e dialogue only for a brief disoussion, and then he departs from the soene 
in favor of his more outspoken disciples, Polus and Callicles. Polus 
enunoiates the direot moral issue,2 when he objects to Socrates' ~tatement 
that to do wrong is a greater evil than to suffer wrong, for, Polus declare~ 
he is envious of the liberty of doing whatever one thinks f1 t, even to kill-
ing or imprisoning anyone he pleases. Rhetorio, to determine the purpose ot 
whioh the disoussion began, gives just suoh a power, beoause it makes its end 
Pleasure, and enables anyone to obtain what he desires. Anr::.appeal is made by 
Polus to the example and opinion ot the majority of men to justify his 
belief. 
2 Plato, Gorgias, V, translated by W.R.M. Lamb. Loeb Classioal Library, 
Wm. Heinemann, London, 1925, 469 c. 
f 
There is little progress made in the argument, however, uhtil 
Polus finally admits that to do wrong is more shameful,~rXLo~, than to suf-
fer wrong, though it is not more evil. To the foul or shameful is opposed 
the fair or noble,K~~:V, and to Polus there is a distinotion between the 
.~ 
fair and good, between the foul and evil. Soorates leads him to agree to the 
definition that the fair is that whioh gives either pleasure, benefit or 
both, for our standard of judging fine oolor, \ound, or figures always is 
that they are of same use or confer pleasure. Suoh a definition appeals at 
once to Polus, for the fair is defined by the pleasure and good. But he is 
unaware of what must follow from this. The shameful must be that whioh 
oauses harm. pain or both and the shameful is thus defined by the opposites 
of pleasure and good, namely, pain and evil. 
It is an easy step now for Soorates to show that, although doing 
wrong does not exoeed suffering wrong in the matter of pain, yet it is 
fouler by reason of an exoess of evil and no one, surely, would ohoose that 
~ 
which is more evil. Henoe, no one would ohoose to do wrong rather than to 
suffer it. 
But we still have a seoond point to prove, "whether for a wrong-
doer to pay the penalty is the greatest of evils," as Polus supposes, "or to 
esoape the penalty is greater."' Soorates demonstrates his opinion by show-
ing that the "patient" reoeives an effeot of the same kind as the actfon of 
the agent, for example, if the striker strikes hard or quiok, the thing 
, Ibid., 476 a. 
! 
19 
.' struck is struck in the same way. Just punishment. however, is fair and con-
fers good. Therefore, he who suffers it is benefitted and is relieved from 
badness of soul. Further, injustice, the vice of the soul, is the most 
shameful of all things, not by reason of t4e pain it oauses, but by reason of 
the harm it brings. And whatever oonfers the greatest harm must be the 
greatest evil in the world. Justice, on the oontrary, Whioh relieves us of 
this evil, must be the fairest of all things •• Now paying the penalty im-
parts to us justice and relieves us of injustioe. The true use of rhetoric, 
therefore, would be, not to obtain whatever pleasure we desire, even pro-
tecting us from penalty, but to preserve us from wrongdoing, or if we should 
do wrong, to secure punishment and thus relieve us of the greatest evil. 
Polus is thus dismissed to admit a more vigorous and more danger-
ous opponent, who is a thorough-going Hedonist, sincere and oonfident in his 
conviotions. The fair-mindedness of Plato and his eagerness for the truth, 
we might mention here, are nowhere more evident than in this soene. In the. 
person of Callioles Plato puts the strongest defense of the hedonistio doc-
trine, a defense,whioh even its ablest followers oould soarcely equal. 
Ca1lioles introduoes immediately the distinction, familiar to , 
readers of Plato and the writers of the period, between nature and conven-
tion, 9>,jQ'l&S - v: res. In one full sweep he pushes aside the ourrent code of 
morality as oonventional, "made by the laws of the weaker sort of men to 
prevent the stronger from taking advantage of them." But the law of nature 
decrees otherwise, and "it is obvious in many cases, that ••• right has been 
decided to oonsist in the sway and advantage of the stronger over ~e 
weaker. 114 
Oallicles goes on to chide Socrates for remaining in the pursuit of 
philosophy, which is a fine thing for a young, lad to toy with, but is no fit 
ocoupation for a mature man, sinoe it hinders him from attending to more 
praotioal duties and renders him helpless as a child and unfit to protect 
himself against the encroachments of unjust me,. 
There is no doubt about Oa11icle8 1 opinion, for he i. olear and 
outspoken, qualities, which Socrates is not loath to commend. Here is a 
worthy opponent to test his mettle and prove the strength of Hedonism, if it 
be possible. 
Socrates proceeds with his usual definition of terms. The stronger 
are the better and determine what is right. But Who are the stronger? 
Callicles makes it clear that he is not referring to the physioal1y stronger, 
but to the better and the wiser, "who should have rule and advantage over ... 
the weaker peop1e. n5 Advantage? queries Socrates. A dootor is wiaer in the 
matter of proper nourishment, and therefore, he should have more food? Or 
the weaver is wiser and should have more olothes? Or the shoemaker should 
wear the biggest shoes? In what respeot 1s the superior man to have the ad-
vantage of the larger number? 
Irritated Callic1es now develops his view more fully. The better 
are "men of wisdom and manliness in public affairs. Theae are the persons 
who ought to rule our oities and justice means this, that these should have 
45 Ibid., 483 d. 
Ibid., 490 a. 
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more than other people, the ruler than the ruled. n6 They must. thell, 
socrates rejoins, have more than themselves, for they must be "self-
controlled, self-mastering, ruler of the pleasures and the desires that are 
in themselves. ,,7 Callicles' frank reply to. t~is is that temperance is non-
sense, for no one can be happy when he is enslaved. To live rightly we 
should let our desires be strong as possible and satisfy each desire by our 
intelligenoe and manliness. People regard lio~tiousness as disgraceful 
only beoause they oannot achieve all the pleasures they desire. stones and 
corpses would be extremely happy, if to want nothing were happiness. 
The fables of the sieve and the jars are brought forth by Socrates 
to answer Callioles. The licentious man's soul is like a sieve, which is 
constantly being filled up and leaking out. No matter how muoh such a man 
attempts to satisfy his cravings he never reaches satiety. Far better is 
the life of the self-controlled man, who keeps his sOl1l well-ordered and con-
tent with what it possesses. A further oomparison may be stressed in the~ 
example of the two men having many jars, one filled with honey, a second 
with milk, and so forth. These supplies are not readily available. but can 
be obtained only through strenuous labor. One of the men has good jars and 
onoe he fills them is at ease, but the other possesses leaky and decayed 
jars, so that he must be filling them constantly with a great deal of 
trouble. So it is with the self-controlled and the licentious man. Is it 
not manifest whioh of the two lives i8 the happier? 
; Ibid., 491 d. 
Ibid., 491 e. 
f 
All this has no effect on Oallicles. Plea8ure oonsists ~n a oon-
stant filling up and when one has had his fill he oan have no more pleasure 
than a stone. The life of pleasure is eating When hungry, drinking when 
thirsty, and having all the other desires an? satisfying them. Soorates 
;;. 47 
abashes' Callioles by suggesting also that "a man who has an itch and wants 
to soratoh, and may soratoh in all freedom, oan pass his life happily in 
onntinually soratohing. H8 Oal1icles is bound.to admit on his own prinoiples 
that even suoh a life would be pleasant and happy. 
Callioles is no longer pleased with the trend of the disoussion, 
but he need not have allowed such a turn, as Soorates suggests, had he dis-
tinguished between the good and bad sorts of pleasures. Is there no dis-
tinction of pleasures, or is pleasure the same as the good, or is there 
some pleasure whioh is not good? To be oonsistent Oallio1e8 must maintain, 
as he admits, that pleasure and good are the same.9 The good in the mind of 
Oallioles is thus mere unoonditional enjoyment. Soorates introduoes the 
... 
question of opposites to prove that there must be a distinotion. A man oan-
not possess health and disease, for example, in respeot to his eye at the 
same time, for they are inoompatible. To speed and slowness, even to good-
ness and happiness, and badness and wretchedness, to all classes of oppo-
sites the same thing must apply. To this Oallicles assents, but he has al-
ready asserted that being hungry is painful and eating While hungry is 
8 Ibid., 494c. 
9 Ibid •• 495 a. 
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pleasant, and the same with being thirsty and drinking. It is evicfent then 
that pain and pleasure occupy the same subject at the same time, and depart 
at the same time, for when one ceases to be hungry he ceases to feel pleasure 
in eating. The good and bad, however, cannot exist simultaneously in the 
same subject, therefore, pleasure is different from the good. 
The argument may be oonsidered in a slightly varied form. The 
good men are the brave and the wise; the cowar~ly and the fools are bad. 
But both the foolish and the wise feel pleasure almost equally, the fool, 
perhaps, feels even more, for instance. in war, when the enemy retreats, and 
in the opposite circumstances. when the enemy advances, both alike experience 
pain. Now it·is agreed upon that the good are good by the presence of good 
things, and the bad are bad by the presenoe of bad things. Consider then 
what we must conclude, if pleasure is the same as good and pain is the same 
as bad. The more pleasure which a man experiences the better he becomes and 
in our previous example shall we say that the bad man, who feels more 
-
pleasure, is made better than the wise man, who is already good? 
CUllicles is, therefore, forced to abandon his former position and 
he tries to escape by deolaring that all along he really believed that there 
was such a distinction as good and bad between pleasures. Those which are 
beneficial, conferring health or strength and the like are good, the oppo-
site are evil. IO In like manner there are good and bad pains. With this 
admission we reach the oonclusion of our whole argument. Pleasure is not 
10 Ibid., 499 b c d. 
t 
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.' the norm of our conduot, but the good, which is distinct from it. All our 
actions should be performed with the good in view, and pleasure too is for 
the sake of the good. To determine the pleasures that are good for us we 
need a man with professional skill and knowle4ge, a knowledge Whioh is 
deeper and more true than the mere art of rhetoric, whioh seeks only to 
gratify us with pleasures without inquiring whether they are good or bad. 
'So there is my acoount of the matter~ and I say that this 
is the truth; and that, ,if this is true, anyone as it 
seems, who desires to be happy must ensue and praotioe 
temperanoe, and flee licentiousness, eaoh of us as fast 
as his feet will oarry him, and must oontrive, if 
possible, to need no oorreotion; but if he have need of 
it, either himself or anyone belonging to him, either an 
individual or a oity, then right must be applied and they 
must be corrected, if they are to be happy. This, in my 
opinion, is the mark on whioh a man should fix his eyes 
throughout life; he should ooncentrate all his own and 
his city's efforts on this one business of providing a 
man who would be blessed with needful justice and temper-
ance; not letting one's desires go unrestrained and in 
one's attempts to satisfy them -- an interminable 
trouble -- leading the life of a robber. For neither to 
any of itS fellow men can such a one be dear, nor to 
God ••• 
Akin t 0 th~s argument between Soorates and Callicles over the ad-
vantages of rhetorio whose aim is pleasure and of philosophy whose aim is 
the good is the debate in the Philebus between Socrates and Protarohus. 
The dialogue opens with the direot statement of its aim to prove clearly 
whether the life of pleasure or the life of wisdom oan be the good and happy 
11 Ibid., 507 d e. 
f 
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life for all men. .' To express it in the terms already used in the gorgias. 
whether pleasure rather than intelligence is the good. 
Socrates definitely states in the very beginning what he means by 
the good, so that the goal of the discussion ~ill be true and clear. The 
;.;. 4'7 c, \ 'i1 good for man is a condition and state, ~ ~I ~ 1(01. ,J, tC.C7£' .. ,~, of soul which can 
make any man's life happy.12 With this definition Protarchus is also in 
accord. The question, therefore, to be deoide~is whether pleasure or 
thought, or even something else is this state and condition. 
The question of the kinds of pleasure is broaohed by Socrates and 
he immediately enters upon a brief delineation of the ever troublesome and 
important problem of the one and many. Since this section of the dialogue 
has little influence on the argument we are.now considering, it is not to the 
point to summarize the thought content here. Indeed, it seems to confuse the 
issue for Socrates and Protarchus at the moment. so they leave it aside to 
decide apart the primary issue. 
Some notion of the nature of the good would make it clear whether 
pleasure or thought fulfil the proper requirements. The good, it is agreed, 
, 
is neoessarily something perfect or complete,r~~~ov, and sufficient in it- , 
t , 
self, ('(" VCI v. But what does experience and reason show us to be the case in 
the life of pleasure or of thought considered separately? Protarchus at 
first believes that he could be supremely happy spending his whole life in 
the enjoyment of the greatest pleasures with no need for wisdom or 
12 Cf. Plato, Philebus. III, translated by H.N. Fowler. Loeb Classical 
Library, Wm. Heinemann, L9ndon •. 19Z5. 11 d. 
intelligence. Socrates, however, prodding him with questions, oon4inces him 
that without mind or memory or true opinion a man could not know if he was 
feeling pleasure at the moment, nor recall that he had ever enjoyed pleasure, 
nor consider the manifold pleasures that he,m~ght experience in the future. 
some intelleotual activity is demanded in the life of man. Hence, no one 
would ohoose a life of mere pleasure. But no one, also, would choose a life 
of mere thought, for who oould ever disoover aiY man leading a life of wis-
dom and knowledge entirely void of any feeling? It is a life unnatural for 
man. 
It is manifest, then, that the good for man is neither all 
pleasure nor all thought, but it seems to consist in a mixture of the two. 
Although neither of the two oan be identified with the good, beoause they 
are not, taken separately, suffioient in themselves, it is possible that 
joined together they might be the good. The disoussion continues on with 
pleasure and thought vying for the second prize, the highest place in the • 
mixture of the two lives. The dispute, however, is so olosely linked to the 
discussion of the nature and kinds of pleasure that it would only oonfuse us 
to follow it up here. The main point, at least, is established. Pleasure 
is not the good. 
In the first book of the Republic we have a definite restatement 
of the argument of Gallicles in the Gorgias. Though no direct mentio~ is 
made of pleasure, it is implicit in Thrasymachus' contention that right is 
the advantage of the stronger. Moreover, we are again faced with a strong 
defense by a capable opponent of immorality, the obtaining of what one de-
sires by any means whatsoever. 
f 
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The argument is buH t around the search for a true defini t'ion of 
justice, and Socrates' pursuit against immoral claims is much the same as 
that in the Gorgias, where the disoussion was pointed towards the disoovery 
of the purpose of rhetorio. It takes a sligh~ly different twist, however, 
when Thrasymaohus, unlike Polus in the Gorgias, maintains that injustioe is 
not disgraoeful, but profitable. Moreover, injustioe is virtue and wisdom, 
while justioe is the oontrary. Soorates seour~ the upper hand, when 
Thrasymaohus admits that "eaoh man is as his like is. If the unjust man is 
like the wise and good, then he is wise and good, and so for the just man. ,,13 
But we see, argues Socrates, that the just man tries to get the better of 
only the unjust man, while the unjust man tries to secure an advantage over 
both t he just and unjust, for he strives to be superior over all. The good 
and wise craftsman tries to outdo only the foolish and ignorant oraftsman. 
Take the example of the musioian. A musician would not overtighten the 
strings of his 1 yre to exoeed another musician, but would try to tighten 
them properly only to exoeed a non-musician, or a foolish man, ignorant of 
these matters. The just man is like this good and wise musician, and must, 
therefore according to the prinoiple stated, himself be good and wise. 
Socrates strengthens his argument by observing that even among 
thieves there must be honor in order that hatreds and dissensions may be 
• 
avoided. In a state, too, or in an army, a family, or in one's own person 
justice is the souroe of union, while injustioe creates variances and 
13 Plato, The RepUblio, I, translated by Paul Shorey. Loeb Classical 
Library,-w.m. Heineman, London, 1930, 349 d. 
, 
.' renders the state or army or family or person incapable of action. 
Thrasymachus' oontention that right is the advantage of the 
28 
stronger, by whioh he means that one should have the power to do whatever he 
likes and obtain whatever he desires, cannot ~tand up under the fire of 
Socrates' relentless logic. In the downfall of Thrasymachus we witness 
another refutation of the very doctrine, which Callioles upheld in the 
Gorgias. Our own pleasure cannot be the moti~ force and only goal of our 
life tothe exolusion of everything else. Certainly, then, pleasure is not 
the good, which must be the end of all our actions. 
It is proper before closing this chapter to disouss here a diffi-
eulty that might be lodged against our claim that Plato was a determined 
adversary of the thesis identifying pleasure with the good. It is a little 
baffling at first reading to discover in the Protagoras that Socrates 
taking pleasure as the good makes a very plausible argument to prove a par-
ticular point and apparently contradiots his strong protestations in other. 
dialogues. 
Let us review the pert~'.nent passage in the Protagoras first, then 
we will attempt a reconciliation.14 Pleasure is introduced into the dia-
logue in an attempt to decide whether courage like other forms of goodness 
already oonsidered oan be said to be a matter of knowledge. Socrates asks 
. 
Protagoras whether he would agree with the majority of men in saying that 
things are good in so far as they are pleasant. and that painful things are 
14 Plato, Protagoras, IV, translated by W.R.M. Lamb. Loeb Classical Library, 
Wm. Heinemann, London, 1924. 353 a. 
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respect of pain, the fewer and smaller should be chosen. .' But people who do 
evil are mistaken in their calculation. When they weigh the pleasant 
against the painful and find that the painful are out-balanced by the 
pleasant, whether the near by the remote, or tpe remote by the near, they 
should choose that course of action to Which the pleasant are attached, but 
not the course in Which the pleasant are outweighed by the painful. It is 
precisely in this, however, that men err, for ~ey do not measure things 
correctly. They consider the things of the moment the greater, just as in 
the matter of distance. Objects close up look larger than objects in the 
distance, though they are not really so. Therefore, this IIbeing overcome by 
pleasure" is a matter of ignorance. Men err through a lack of knowledge and, 
to be accurate, a knowledge of measurement. 
The facility and precision with which Plato states the case for the 
common man should not shock us or blind us to the fact that Socrates does not 
truly identify himself with hedonistic principles. To explain away the 
apparent contradiotion in Plato's theory of pleasure has not presented an in-
surmountable obstacle for eminent Plato scholars.15 Though their explana-
tions vary, they are all in agreement that there is no contradiction nor f 
change of opinion. 
It must be remembered that the argument of pleasure is introduoed 
. 
into the dialogue only to show that oourage, a form of goodness, is identi-
fied with knowledge. Adopting the fundamental principle of the common man, 
.. 
15 Cf. A.E. Taylor, Plato the Man and His 'Work, Dial Press Ino., New York, 
1936) Paul Shorey, What-pra~Said, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 
1934; G.M.A. Grube, Plato's Thought, Methuen and Co. Ltd., London, 1935. 

.' happiness is to be sought by developing and gratifying 6 
the appetite for the pleasures of sense and ambition. 1 
32 
In the Gorgias. Philebus, and Republic, then, we have treated of 
Plato's view of Hedonism as the sole opponent to his theory of pleasure • 
. 
Wi th t he explanation of the agreement of the'io F'rotagoras with his criticism 
of Hedonism we bring to a conclusion the negative section of Plato's theory. 
The remaining chapters will deal with the discussion of the positive aspect 
,. 
of his treatise on pleasure. 
6 Paul Shorey, "The Unity of Plato's Thought," The Dicennial Publications, 
First Series, VI, University of Chicago Press:-Chicago, 1904, 148 (22). 
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.' CHAPTER III 
THE ORIGIN, NATURE AND KINDS OF PLEASURE 
Plato, as we have seen in the pre~G~s ohapter, was deoidedly an 
.. 47 
adversary of Hedonism. He sternly rejeoted the doctrine whioh identified 
pleasure with the good, for it reduoed the ultimate end of all our actions 
and desires to the pleasure basis. This stand 4t>lato maintained through all 
of his dialogues. He was aware, however, in his relentless warfare on 
Hedonism that mere refutation of an opponent's thesis will not effeot a oon-
version,unless a positive expression of one's one doctrine follows along. 
Pleasure may not be the good at which all must aim as the ultimate 
end of life to obtain the happy life, whioh all men desire, but pleasure does 
have a part in the happy life. We have already seen that Plato in the 
Philebu8 declares a life devoid of all pleasure to be certainly not a human 
existenoe. Some p~ea8ur~ is demanded by the nature of man. 
Henoe we find Plato in his later dialogues attempting to determine 
the plaoe of pleasure in the life of man. To faoilitate the proper place-
ment of pleasure in the scheme of life we will first attend in this ohapter ' 
to Plato's discussion of the origin, nature and variety of pleasure. 
Plato's fullest treatment of the positiVe aspect, for having dis-
missed his negative approach to the subject in the second chapter it is to 
the positive expression of his doctrine we now turn, is found in the 
Philebus and Republic. To the Philebus we will first give our attention to 
33 
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disouss the preliminaries of the question. .' 
We must remember that the thesis of the Philebus is to determine 
the relative significance of pleasure and knowledge in the good life of man. 
It has already been seen that neither can ol~m the first plaoe, for neither 
;.;. .. ., 
is sufficient in itself to make man happy. However, one may be of more im-
portance than the other in the mixture consistuting the good and happy life. 
All reality must be divided into fou~classes, the infinite 
(;'rrf.tfov), the finite (rr~fo(,,!», the mixed (rI.I(dv), and the cause (""~T:J..).l 
The infinite is desoribed best, perhaps, by a few examples. It is that 
which possesses the more or less in its very nature, so that it has no 
definite or determined degree, like the hotter and colder, the quioker and 
slower, the greater and smaller. The finite, however, does possess suoh a 
limitation and to this olass belong the equal and the double, or whatever is 
a definite number or measure. The third class is olearly understood from 
the explanation of the first two, for it comes into being when number or 
measure is introduced into the higher or lower tones, for example, so that 
a definite harmony is arranged. The same applies to hot and cold weather to 
produce the perfection of the seasons. The fourth principle, cause, tollows f 
from the proposition that everything which comes into being, must 
necessarily have a cause for its being. The cause is naturally distinct 
both from that which it produces, the generation (t'V~~/~), and that ~ich 
is used for the generation, the matter. The generation, of course, is the 
I Philebus, 23 c ft. 
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.' third class of mixture, and the matter is the first and second clas8, the 
infinite and finite, which are brought into combination. 
Since all reality falls under one of these divisions, knowledge, 
pleasure and the mixture of both, which has b~en agreed upon is the good 
life, must take their place. It is evident from our explanation of the 
three classes to Which class the mixed life belongs. It is of the third 
class. But what of pleasure? Pleasure and pa~ have no limit, but admit of 
the more or less, that is, they have degrees. Therefore, they belong to the 
class of the infinite, which has neither a beginning, a middle, nor an end. 
To classify mind Socrates appeals to the testimony of all philosophers that 
2 
"mind is the king of heaven and earth," and that all things in the universe 
are not governed by mere chance, but are ordered and directed by mind and a 
marvellous wisdom. Hence, it is agreed, after some little discussion that 
mind is certainly akin to cause and thus belongs to the fourth class. 
It is here that we enter into the formal discussion most pertine~ 
to our chapter, the origin and nature of pleasure. Socrates' words earlier 
in the dialogue aptly introduces our problem • 
••• but pleasure I know has various aspects, and ••• we 
must consider and examine what her nature is. For 
when you just simply hear her name, she is only one 
thing, but surely she takes on all sorts of shapes, 
which are even, in a way, unlike eaoh other. For in-
stance, we say that a man who li vas without restraint 
has pleasure, that the self-restrained man takes 
pleasure in his very self-restraint; and again that 
2 Ibid., 28 c. 
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the fool, lIho is full of foolish opinions and hopes is 
pleased, and also that the wise man takes pleasure in 
his very wisdom. And would not any person, who said 
these bo kinds of pleasure were like eaoh other, be 
rightlyregarded as a foo11 3 
.' 
Continuing; with the Philebus we will first examine the orig:I:~in of 
. 
. .. ; 
pleasure and throu!h the analysis of its origin arrive at a knowledge ee of its 
nature, as far asPlato ohose to define its nature. 
Pleasure and pain, as we have seen, bel'flg to the first olae4'1ss, 
that of the infinite, since neither admits a limit in its own ooncept.;tt. We 
must now, however,eonsider the subjeot of the pleasures, the receptao4'101o of 
the pleasures, aruexamine the aotual conditions of the origin of pleaeeasure 
and pain. It willbe noted that we discuss the question of pain alonsuag with 
that of pleasure,~cause, as Soorates asserts, pleasure oannot be SUOUlooess-
fully examined apart from pain. 4 Actual pleasure and pain are always as found 
or arise in cortam definite degrees in a living creature. Hence, therlhey 
naturally origina~ in the combined class of the infinite bounded by t the 
finite, which is the third class of the mixture. The subject of the 
pleasures and pains possesses a definite form and at any given moment ;:l; the 
pleasures and pains themselves are of a certain definite degree. 
Pain is !enerated whenever the harmony of nature is disturbed>ed, 
that is, whenever the proper functioning of the parts aocording to na ... ,ature is 
impeded or disrupted.. But when this harmony is restored to nature, tH;th~m 
pleasure comes into being. 
~ Ibid., 12 c d. 
Ibid., 31 b. 
f 
To illustrate we may use Plato's own examples. Hunger is·pain, 
beoause it is a dissolution or breaking down process, while eating, which is 
the restoration or filling-up process, is pl~asure. 
Thirst again is a destruction and a pain, but the filling 
wi th moisture of that whioh was drl;e'4, up is a pleasure. 
Then, too, the unnatural dissolution and disintegration 
we experienoe through heat are a pain, but the natural 
restoration and oooling are a pleasure.5 
Therefore, we see that we have not on.j.y explained the Drigin, but 
defined the nature of pleasure. For 
whenever in the class of living beings, whioh ••• arises 
outof' the natural union of the infinite and finite, that 
union is destroyed, the destruction is pain, and the 
passage and return of all things to their own nature is· 
pleasure.6 
In the ninth book of the Republic, also, we find a rather lengthy 
disquisition on pleasure, which gives us some insight on the nature of 
pleasure as Plato considers it. The discussion is important both for the 
new ideas, Which it introduoes to the theory being expounded, and because 
it cDrroborates the definition of pleasure already considered in the 
Philebus. 
Soorates sets himself to the problem of the nature of pleasure 
itself after he has conduoted a consideration of the three parts of the 
soul and the three kinds of pleasure proper to eaoh part. This section of 
the disoourse we shall take up later in the fourth chapter. 
5 Ibid., 32 a. 
6 Ibid., 32 b. 
f 
Pleasure is opposed to pain and there is a neutral state, ·~ioh is 
neither pleasure nor pain. This neutral state is a sort of repose of the 
soul. People who are sick consider this mere rest and oessation from pain as 
the greatest pleasure. Yet, when these same ~ople are in good health and 
without real pleasure this neutral state seems painful. But, pleasure and 
I pain are really aotive states, movements,K'v~~£'s • Therefore, the mere ab-
senoe of pain is not pleasure, neither is the m.re absence of pleasure pain. 
The state of rest, Which is said to be most pleasant or painful, is merely an 
appearance and not a reality, for it is but a matter of comparison with a 
previous state of acute pleasure or pain. MoreoTer, we have confirmation 
that pleasure is not cessation from pain, and the opposite, from the faot 
that there are some pleasures, whioh are not preoeded by pain, for example, 
the pleasures of smell. 
There is, then, let us say, an upper, a middle and a lower region. 
A person asoending from the lower region to the middle region, through 
ignoranoe, might believe that he has reached the upper region, and, conversely, 
a man descending from the upper region to the middle region might think that 
he has fallen to the lower region. This is the case of people who are 
inexperienoed with the truth and have a wrong estimate of pleasure and pain, 
so that very often they oonsider the neutral state of rest as either 
pleasant or painful, when it is merely a cessation from one or the other. 
It is like making a comparison of black with gray beoause, through ignoranoe 
of oolor, the gray is considered white. 
f 
There tollows then an argument to prove that the pleasure1l of the 
Jdnd a$~re more real and true, and thus superior to the pleasures ot the body. 
At the ~ moment we are not so muoh interested in the process of the argument 
and it.;;::;s conclusion, as in the ideas contained ,therein, which support our 
;.;. .. " 
view 0 .. 01 what Plato considered the nature of pleasure. 
Which has more real being, that which is concerned with 
the invariable, the immortal, the true, and is found in 
the invariable, immortal, true; or t~t which is con-
cerned with the variable and. mortal and is found in the 
variable and mortal?7 
Clearly, that which is connected with the invariable, for the in-
variab:£ole partakes of knowledge, truth and essential being in the same 
degree ••• 
And if there be a pleasure in being filled with that 
whioh agrees with nature, that whioh is more really 
tilled with more real being, will have more real and 
true joy and pleasure; whereas that which participates 
in less real being will be less truly and surely 
satisfied, and will participate in a less true and 
real pleasure.8 
!herete>-ore we have the oonclusion that 
Those who know not wisdom and virtue, and are always 
busy with gluttony arid sensuality, go doWll and up 
again as far as the middle region; and in this space 
they move at random throughout life, but they never 
pass into the true upper world; thither they neither 
look, nor do t hey ever find their way, neither are 
they truly filled wi th true being, nor do t hey taste 
of true and abiding pleasure.9 
~. The Dialogues of Platoi III, _6ers~ Press, EUm~ey M1 ford, tra~slated by B. Jowett. 1924, 585 c. 
Oxford 
9) Ibid ••• , 585 e. 
Ibid.. ., 586 a. 
f 
.' The Republic thus adds a new note to the analysis of the nature of 
pleasUre. Pleasure is a movement. But what sort of a movement? This is a 
rather general term, vague enough, which needs to be olarified. From 
Plato's argument in favor of the pleasures of .the mind we find that pleas~r. 
;;. "'I 
is a movement, which is connected with a filling-up of that which agrees with 
nature. There is a familiar eoho in these words of the explanation of 
pleasure in the Philebus. Moreover, the pleas~es of the mind, which are the 
pleasures of the philosopher, are the real and true pleasures. But, in the 
philosopher's soul every part finds its own pleasure and its own satisfaction 
in perfect harmony.' The definition of the Republic, then, seems to embrace 
and is clarified by the definition found in the Philebus. Pleasure is a 
movement which oonsists in the restoration of the harmony of any faculty 
aocording to its own nature. 
That such was the belief of Plato we have confirmation from a 
passage in the Timaeus. Since it but repeats what we have already discusse~ 
we will quote only a brief part of it, more to strengthen the doctrine al-
ready expounded than to elucidate our position. 
Now, we must conceive of pleasure and pain in this way. 
An impression produced in us contrary to nature and 
violent, if sudden is painful; and again, the sudden 
return to nature is pleasant, ai8 that which is gentle 
and gradual is imperceptible ••• 
The notions of a sudden return and of the imperoeptibility of cer-
tain pleasures will beoome olear from a later explanation of the kinds of 
10 Plato, The Dialogues of Plato, III, translated by B. Jowett. Oxford 
University Press, Humphrey Milford, 1924, 64 c. 
f 
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.' pleasure. Vlliat is to be noted especially, here, is the repetition of the 
ideas defining the nature of pleasure and pain. Pain is a dissolution of the 
parts of an organi&m contrary to nature but pleasure is the restoration of 
the harmonious funotioning of the parts accor~ing to nature. 
In determining the nature of pleasure only examples of the clearly 
physical pleasures were used to illustrate. Pleasure, it would seem, how-
ever, admits of a greater variety than the mert physical. The reality of 
the various kinds of pleasure, then, we must now study. 
The first classification is a distinction between pleasures of the 
body and pleasures of the soul. The matter for our discussion of the kinds 
of pleasure will be taken from the Philebus, unless otherwise stated. 
The satisfaction of hunger and the quenching of thirst are clearly 
physical pleasures, but If there is another kind of pleasure and pain, which 
belongs to the soul herself, apart from the body, and arises through 
expectation. nIl The pleasure of the soul is a mental anticipation of a 
restoration and has its origin in memory. Because of this connection with 
memory, Plato diverts from the main point for a moment to explain just what 
is meant by memory and recollection, but for our purpose it is not 
necessary to relate this Whole discussion. 
A man who is hungry or thirsty desires food or drink, or more pre-
• 
cisely, being filled with food or drink. It cannot be the body that desires 
such repletion, for the body is at the moment undergoing depletion and it 
cannot be passing through two antithetic processes at the same time. 
11 Philebus, 32 c. 
f 
Hence, it is the soul, which desires the repletion and the soul doe~ so in 
virtue of the memory of the opposite of the actual conditions of the body. 
One in such a state experienoes both pain and pleasure at the same time, 
pain, because he is actually in a state of di~solution of thirst or hunger, 
pleasure. because he anticipates restoration or the filling-up of his hunger 
or thirst. 
The force of the argument is this. ~noe the desire of repletion 
by means of the memory belongs to the soul, then also, the acoompanying 
pleasure must belong to the soul. And, therefore. the classifioation of 
pleasures into those of the body and those of the soul is legitimate. 
There is a further point to be noted here. Beoause of memory. a 
person is subject to the feeling of both pleasure and pain at the same time. 
There is pain by reason of the bodily sensation of hunger and thirst. but, 
since there is also an anticipation of being filled, there is, too. the 
pleasure of memory, which belongs to the soul. Plato wishes to emphasize 
that the pleasures we are speaking of are a mixed pleasure, that is, they 
are aocompanied by pain of the body, and thuse he paves the way for a dis-
tinction between the mixed and the pure pleasures. There is also another f 
obvious reason for establishing this pleasure of the soul, namely, to smooth 
the path for an introduction of the pure pleasures of the soul, which have 
no connection with the body. 
Before we arrive at the divisions of the pure pleasures. however, 
we are first led to consider the true and false pleasures, which are 
immediately suggested by the pleasures dependent on mental anticipation. 
r 
.' Plato wishes to establish that just as there are true and false opinions, 
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true and false fears, true and false expectations, so there oan be true and 
false pleasures, beoause they are based upon true and false hopes and 
opinions.12 
Not for a minute does Plato believe that the feeling of pleasure, 
though false, is not real; no more than he believes a judgment ceases to be a 
fact, because it is false. Such an objeotion ~not be leveled at him. 
There is such a process as judging and suoh a process as 
feeling pleased. For each, then, there is an object, 
for we always judge something or are pleased with some-
thing. In the case of judging, whether the judgment be 
true or false, it does not oeases to be a real judgment. 
The same should apply to pleasure. A false feeling of 
pleasure, though false, would not cease to be a real 
feeling of pleasure.13 
Protarchus, the antagonist in the Philebus, is however, unwilling to eoncede 
that pleasure may be false, though he willingly grants that pleasure admits 
the qualifications, Ilgreat,1f Ifsmall," "intense lf and even Ilright or wrong." 
Pleasure, if it arises through a connection with false belief, is not in it-
self false, but the judgment only is false. He will grant nothing further. 
We must consider, then, from the beginning that there is such a 
thing as true and false opinion, and thaF pleasure and pain very often follow 
them. The power of forming opinion comes from perception and memory. Our 
perceptions are like a writer, who writes the things perceived as word, in 
our souls, and according as truth or falsity is written in us our opinions 
and statements concerning the things perceived will be true or false. 
12 6 Ibid., 3 c. 
13 Taylor, Plato the Man and His Work, 421, Cf. Philebus, 37 a-c. 
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Then, we might regard memory as a painter, who paints images to picture the 
words written in our souls, and again true or false opinions will result 
according as the images illustrate true or false words. 
Restricting ourselves to the pleasures and pains of the soul, we 
. 
. ~ 
have seen that they are based on the anticipation of a future condition. The 
images, which we have just considered, relate to the past and the present, 
but especially to the future, "for we are alWay, filled with hopes all our 
lives. n14 
Often a man sees an abundance of gold coming into his 
possession, and in its train many pleasures; and he 
even sees a picture of himself enjoying himself im-
mensely. Shall we or shall we not say that of these 
pictures those are for the most part true which are 
presented to the good men, beoause they are friends 
of the gods, whereas thos~ presented to the bad are 
for the most part false.l~ 
The point Socrates is driving home he further olarifies. Opinions 
or judgments are true or false if they are, or are not, based upon reality. 
~ The same applies to pleasure. Although one may really feel pleasure, yet, if 
it is not based upon reality, either past, or present, or future, it is false 
The good man generally has true pleasures beoause he has hopes of things con-
sonant with the wishes of the gods, but the bad man generally has false 
pleasures because he desires in a day-dreaming sort of fashion things whioh 
are not pleasing to the gods, and are impossible of fulfillment, suoh as 
. 
massive wealth. Fear, anger, or any of the other passions might be called 
true or false in a similar manner. It would seem, also, though Protarohus 
14 Philebus, 39 e. 
15 Ibid., 40 a b. 
f 
.' refuses to allow it, that pleasures are bad only when they are false and 
ieceptive. 
Socrates, however, defers the dispute on the matter of good and bad 
~leasure, interesting though it be, to insist ?n another argument in proof of 
.~ 
~he falsity of some pleasures. 
It has been determined already that pleasure and pain may exist 
side by side when the body is feeling pain but jhe soul is experiencing 
pleasure through the anticipation of the opposite condition. Pleasure and 
pain have also been classified as infinite, admitting of degrees. In each 
case it is judgment which determines whether an anticipated pain or pleasure 
is greater or smaller or more intense when compared with its opposite or one 
another. But, we saw in the Protagoras that sight is very often deceived in 
noting the sizes of things because of distance, so that we often make false 
judgments. The same can happen in the case of pleasure and pain: 
because they are seen at various and changing distances 
and are compared with one another, the pleasures them-
selves appear greater and more intense by comparison 
with the pains, and the pains, in turn, throu~ compari-
son with the pleasures vary inversely as they.16 
Therefore the pains and pleasures do not conform to reality in suoh cases and 
are false. 
For the opponents of the thorough Anti-Hedonists there is also one 
last argument in defense of the division of pleasure into true and fal;e. 
The term "thorough Anti-Hedonist" is not used by Plato himself, but by it is 
~eant the schooi of thought, whioh spurns entirely the life of pleasure and 
~ I,~ Ibid., ~ b. 
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thus seeks to reduce pleasure to a mere negation, the neutral state·'mentioned 
above. Plato, although an adversary of Hedonism, did not deny a certain 
positive value to pleasure as we shall see more clearly in our final chapter. 
There are three types of life, one pleasant, one painful, and one 
neither of the two, so that mere freedom from pain or pleasure is not 
indentical with pleasure and pain. A man, the thorough Anti-Hedonis~, who 
says that to live all one's life without pain \f the pleasantest of all 
things errs, for supposing that we have three things, one gold, one silver 
and one neither of the two, certainly that which is neither cannot become 
either one or the other. Therefore, those who think they feel pleasure when 
there is really a mere absence of pain, experience a false pleasure. 
The point of view of the thorough Anti-Hedonist may be made use of 
in another way, namely, to classify pleasures according to their intensity. 
We have found that pleasure and pain are movements or changes, of which the 
dissolution of our natural state is pain and its restoration is pleasure. 
Certain philosophers inform us that there is always some change taking 
place in our bodies, for everything is in motion. But, just as we are not 
conscious of all the changes in us, for example, of growth and the like, so 
we are not conscious of every fluctuation and change causing pleasure and 
pain in us. It is more true to say, that 
the great changes oause pains and pleasures in us, but 
the moderate and small ones cause no pains or 
pleasures at all. 17 
Thus we may assume that there are three states of life, one of pleasure, 
17 Ibid., 43 c. 
f 
47 
.' another of pain, and the last, the state of neither pleasure nor pain, the 
neutral state. The thorough Anti-Hedonist would have us believe that all 
pleasure is identified with this neutral state and this outlook on the life 
of pleasure is caused by his examination of .th~ nature of pleasure. Although 
Plato does not agree with the oonolusion of the Anti-Hedonist, in fact, 
vigorously rejects it, still the probing of the Anti-Hedonist into the 
problem of pleasure enables Plato to rank pleas.res in the order of 
intensity. 
The oommonest and most intense pleasures are without doubt the 
physioal pleasures, and, morever, not the physioal pleasures oonneoted with 
health and moderation, but those found in disease. People, who are ill, 
experience great pain and suffering, and as a oonsequence, when pleasure does 
follow it is felt to be more intense and greater. For example, one who is 
suffering from a violent fever, experiences an intense thirst, and feels the 
most intense pleapure from a cooling drink. It is true of course that the ~ 
diseased do not experience greater pleasure in the sense of a greater number 
of pleasures. We are speaking only of the degree of intensity. 
If we oonsider further we shall observe that not only in a 
diseased body, but also in a diseased soul is the life of pleasure most 
intense. The self-restrained and virtuous, because they follow the 
prinoiple, IJl'r'I£~V :~d..V ," avoid the extremely pleasant and seek only the 
more moderate, but the unrestrained and dissolute revel in riotous living and 
pursue only the greatest pleasure. Henoe, we find that in the order of 
intensity the physical pleasure rank highest and of these, not those, which 
f 
.' exist in virtue, but those which exist in some depravity of soul or body, are 
the most intense. 
It was precisely because of this result of the examination of 
pleasure that the thorough Anti-Hedonist refr~ined from attributing the name 
of pleasure to such depraved conditions and defined pleasure as a mere 
absence of pain. Plato, however, while admitting the truth of their examina-
tion, rejected their fastidious conclusion and~octrine. Plato's conclusion 
will be seen in the fourth chapter. 
We have arrived now at the final analysis and classifioation of 
pleasures. that of the mixed and pure pleasures. All of the pleasures we 
have treated to this point of our thesis have been mixed with some pain, but 
now we shall find that the highest and truest pleasure is the pure pleasure, 
free from all pain. Let us first dismiss the mixed pleasures. 
Some mixtures are concerned with the body only. and some 
belong only to the soul and are in the soul. and we 
shall also find some mingled pains and pleasures belong-
ing both to the soul and to the body. and the~e are 
sometimes called pleasures, sometimes pains. l 
Short work is made of the mixed pleasures of the body and of the 
... 
body and soul together, for we have seen examples of these pleasures in our ! 
previous classifications. The mixed pleasures of the body occur, 
whenever ••• anyone has two opposite feelings. as we are 
sometimes coldA but growing warm, or are hot, but are 
growing cold. l ), 
18 Ibid., 46 .c. 
19 Ibid., 46 c. 
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The mixed pleasures of the body and soul occur, When the body feels some such 
want as thirst or hunger, but the soul experiences the joys of anticipation. 
The final mixture, that which pertains to the soul alone, though 
it requires slightly more ample explanation, ~ince we have not discussed it 
• 4'7 
hitherto, is likewise easily disposed of. 
Anger, fear, yearning, mourning, love, jealousy, envy are generally 
reckoned to be pains of the soul. But, do we ~t find that they are also 
joined with great pleasures? Our reactions to the performance of tragedies 
and oomedies furnish us with the be.t examples. It is a well-known fact that 
we enjoy the tragedy, though we weep in sympathy for the oharacters. Our 
souls experienoe pleasure and pain simultaneously. The oase of the oomedy 
is not so evident, but from a brief analysis we will observe that it also 
exemplifies the mixed pleasure of the soul. 
Envy, we have admitted, is a pain of the soul, but there is 
pleasure mixed with it, because we see the envious man rejoioing in the mis-
fortune of his neighbors. Ignoranoe, we also agree, is an evil. Now comedy 
is involved with ignoranoe and envy. There are three ways in which one may 
not know himself: first, in regard to wealth, he thinks himself richer than f 
he is; seoond, in regard to physical qualities, he thinks himself handsomer 
or taller than he is; third, in regard to qualities of the soul, he thinks 
that he excels in virtue and wisdom, When he does not. All who plaoe them-
selves into one of these foolish olasses of oonoeit are either powerful or 
weak. If they are weak and unable to revenge themselves, their self-
ignoranoe is ridiculous and they are laughed at. Hence we laugh at the 
r 
false oonoeits of our friends in regard to their strength, wi,dom ~d so 
forth. But, ignoranoe is a misfortune, so we are laughing at the misfor-
tunes of friends, and pleasure in the misfortune of friends is oaused by the 
feeling of envy, which is a pain of the SOUl., 
;.;. --7 
Then our argument declares that when we laugh at the 
ridiculous qualities of our friends, we mix pleasure 
with pain, since we mix it with envy; for we have 
agreed all along that envy is a pain of the soul, and 
that laughter is a pleasure, yet the8P two are present 
at t he same time on such occasions. 2 
There are also unmixed pleasures and these are the pure pleasures 
towards which the whole disoussion of the olassification of pleasures has 
been pointing as a olimax. They are defined as 
those arising from what are oalled beautiful colors or 
from forms, most of those that arise from odors and 
sounds, in short, all those the want of which is un-
felt and painless, whereas the satisfaction furnished 
by them is felt by the senses, pleasant and unmixed 
with pain.21 
Plato oontinues on to express a little more clearly and definitely that he ~ 
does not mean by beauty of form such things as defined piotures of animals 
and paintings, but the pure geometrical forms, whioh are absolutely 
beautiful by nature and have no likeness to such pleasures as the scratohing 
of an itoh or the more vulgar pleasures. 
I mean that those sounds which are smooth and olear and 
send forth a single pure note are beautiful, not rela-
tively, but absolutely, and that there are pleasures, 
which pertain to these by nature and result from them. 22 
20 Ibid., 50 a. 
21 Ibid., 51 b. 
22 Ibid •• 51 d. 
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.' The pleasures of smell, though they are not of an exalted rank, truly belong 
to this class, because they are not conditioned by a previous state of pain. 
To these pleasures of color, sound and $uell, must finally be 
added the pleasures of knowledge, for they are, not preceded by pain, since 
.. .;., 
neither a lack of knowledge is painful like the pain of hunger, nor is the 
condition of having forgotten something that we would like to know on a par-
ticular occasion, a painful feeling in itself llke the process of growing 
hungry after we have eaten. 
Such are the pure pleasures. In them we have reached the crowning 
point of our whole analysis and classification of pleasure. They differ 
from all preceding types of pleasure in that they are entirely free from any 
antecedent pain and are not caused by contrast with any pain, but are always 
pleasant by their own nature. In their highest degree they oonsist in a 
contemplation of the pure colors, pure mathematical forms, in the oontempla-
tion of beauty and truth. They fulfil the conditions of our definition mos~ 
perfectly for they bring our nature into the fullest harmony with all that 
is beautiful and true absolutely. Although they overflow upon the senses 
and by neoessity use bodily functions as instruments, primarily they are f 
pleasures of the soul. Unlike the mixed pleasures, whioh are very often 
oharacterized by violence and intensity, they are well-ordered and 
moderate. Finally, they are the truest pleasures, for just as we could say 
that a little pure white is whiter and more beautiful 
and truer than a great deal of mixed white,23 
23 Ibid., 53 b. 
so we may say 
that any pleasure, however small or infrequent, if 
uncontaminated with pain, is pleasanter and more 
beautiful and more true than a great or often 
repeated pleasure without purity.G4 
24 Ibid., 53 b c. 
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.' CHAPTER IV 
THE ETHICAL VALUE OF PLEASURE IN PLATO'S THEORY 
Having dismissed Plato's adversa~i8ft and de£ined the nature o£ 
.,. 47 
plee.Sl.8 asure, as PIa to conceived it, we come now to t he most important task of 
assi@l igning the proper place to pleasure in Plato's scheme of life. 
That the question of the moral forcl and value of pleasure was 
imponoortant to Plato we have no doubt when we consider that it was a problem, 
whictlo ch occupied him, at least indirectly, from t he very first of his dia-
loguElJrues to the latest. Moreover, in his two most important dialogues, the 
Repu~~blic and the Laws, it is connected withthe major issues and Plato shows 
his 0 concern £or the problem of pleasure by his careful treatment of the 
questts stion. 
The purpose of this chapter will be to trace the progression of 
PlatoMo' s thoughts through the various dialogues in which he chose to treat O't 
pleas&asure in regard to the conduct of one's life. It must be remembered 
that rt it is not within the scope of this thesis to criticize or evaluate, 
but IOl merely to record Plato's theory of pleasure. There is sufficient f 
diffiltficulty in this task in itself, for as has been mentioned be£ore, Plato 
showev~ved no interest in the formation of theories and systems on each 
ques~&3tion and he did not make the systematizing o£ his thought easy for the 
stud~bdent of his writings. Each dialogue is a unit in itself and, though 
ther~1re is a main idea or theme to each, yet the pursuit of the truth on each 
poin~ont is carried on in such fashion that a variety of topics are touched 
53 

.' wi thstand the assaults of so open and frank: an adversary as we meet in 
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Callicles. Complete self-indulgence is the point of Callicles' arguments, 
and consequently the dialogue is concerned entirely with the pleasures of 
the body. The higher pleasures are dismissed ,with barely a mention. 
Plato's attitude to such a life is ever hostile. His strong defense of the 
life of a philosopher by contrast creates in us the impression that Plato is 
the stern defender of a life devoid of all ple~ure. The truth of the 
matter is, however, that he is a staunoh upholder of the life devoid of suoh 
pleasures as Callicles advocates. And this is oonsonant with his later 
views. 
The latter part of the Gorgias could easily be included in any of 
the dialogues pertinent to our thesis. Plato proclaims that a man, who 
wants to be happy and guide his life in friendship with both God and man, 
should be temperate and control his violent desires in order to be just and 
brave and pious. Harmonyor order is the source of goodness. If the soul ". 
is well-ordered it will be good and consequently happy. To be well-ordered 
the soul must be temperate and wise, just, pious and courageous. The life, 
which makes pleasure its guiding-star, will never reach this goal, but the f 
life of philosophy, which fights against pleasure and pursues righteousness 
and virtue, will attain the good and happy life, here and hereafter. 
. 
The connection of the Gorgias and Protagoras has already been 
touohed upon in our expl~ation of the opposite stand which the Protagoras 
seems to take to the identification of pleasure and the good. Convinoed as 
we are that there is no contradiction involved in the doctrine of the 
.' protagoras, it must be admitted, nevertheless, that the tone of the 
--
5 
protagoras is more lenient. For the average man, it is accepted, pleasure 
-
and pain are the only norms of the good and the bad. But even thus con-
sidered, being overcome by pleasure, which is ~ecognized as bad, is but a 
miscalculation and wrong choice of an immediate pleasure, because it appears 
greater at the moment than the pain to which it leads. 
For the common mass of people, then, ~science of measurement is 
required to correct their calculations. Thus knowledge, which may be 
equated with the life of philosophy, again becomes our aim. 
Plato is less stern in that he grants that pleasure and pain must 
be the norm of conduct for the average man, because the ordinary people are, 
perhaps, incapable of anything higher, but Plato is consistent ,with his doc-
trine by maintaining that the average man must be instructed and trained in 
his calculations, so that he chooses the truest and lasting pleasures. 
Turning to the Phaedo we find a very definite and emphatic separa-~ 
tion of ~~e soul and the body, and, consequently, of their respective 
pleasures. The spirit of the Phaedo seems to be even more antagonistic than 
the Gorgias in its outlook upon the pleasure-principle in man. 
Socrates is on the point of death, and, as we might expect, the 
topic of the soul and its immortality is uppermost in his mind. Death is 
just what the philosopher seeks all his life, for death delivers the so~l 
from the body. The t~le philosopher ought to reckon the body of no account 
first, because the pleasures of the body distract him from the pursuit of 
knowledge, secondly, because the bodily organs are not dependable witnesses 
of the truth. 
f 

The soul which has all its life long been given to the sa"W.sfaction 
of the bodily desires and the pursuit of the pleasures of tIle bod:,r will be 
dravm down to the earth and wi 11 wander about haunting tombs, until it is 
fettered to another body. The nature of the body into which the soul is re-
;;. .. " born will be determined by the condition of its wrong-doing. Those given to 
the sensual pleasures of excessive eating and drinking 'will be given the 
bodies of asses or like animals. Those hardened in violence and injustice 
• 
will return into wolves and hawks and such like beasts of prey. Those, too, 
who have practiced temperance and injustice without any intelligence or know-
ledge of the good will receive some more gentle social nature, as the body of 
bees or ants, or may even receive the body of man and give birth to moderate 
men like themselves. 
Only the soul of the philosopher will return to the gods, because 
he has surrendered the delights and lusts of the body, not like the lovers of 
money from a fear of poverty, nor like the lovers of power and honor from a 
fear of ill-repute, but because philosophy has taught him the worthlessness 
of the senses and that a soul imprisoned in the body can never have commu-
nion with the pure and divine. Socrates, thus, declares at the conclusion 
of the remaining discussion on the soul, 
1 
1fuerefore, let a man be of good cheer about his soul, 
Who has cast away the pleasures and ornaments of the 
body as alien to him, and rather hurtful in their 
effects, and followed after the pleasures of knowledge 
in this life; who has adorned the soul in her own 
proper jewels, which are temperance and justice and 
courage and nobility and truth ••• 1 
Plato, fhe Dialogues of Plato, II, translated by B. Jowett. Oxford 
University Press, Humphrey Milford, 1924, 114 e. 
I 
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.' A sterner rejection of plee sure and e. more complete defense of the 
worth of the soul and of true knowledge will scarcely be found elsewhere in 
Plato's works. Are we to admit a contradiction then between the doctrine of 
the Phaedo and the doctrine of the Gorgiasaqd Protagoras, as we interpreted 
;.;. .. ., 
it? 
The dramatic setting is, we believe, important for the understand-
ing of the Phaedo. Plato is rendering an accoknt of the last hours of 
Socrates upon earth. The thoughts expressed are just what we might expect 
to come from Socrates on the occasion. Poised on the brink of death, 
Socrates would naturally underrate the value of pleasure and would enhance 
the value of the soul and its activities. Note well, also,that it is the 
pleasures of the body and those in excess that he especially berates. To 
conduct one's life under the guidance of knowledge, and in so far as 
possible, a knowledge of absolute values and the Supreme Good, is his ideal. 
In the other-worldly atmosphere_ of the dialogue it ought not to be wonderea. 
at, that he extends this ideal to its furthest limits. 
Finally, all pleasure is not even here excluded from the highest 
t;jrpe of life. There are hi[~her pl::;asures, though they are mentioned but I 
once, which accompany the 1 i:'e of the true philosopher and make it an object 
of desire. Plato does not choose to elaborate the point here, however, and 
if we wishto fill out and complete our pic:ture we must look to other 
dialogues. 
In the dovm-to-earth spirit of the Symposium we certainly find a 
more balanced concept of the companionship of soul and bcdy. "The philoso-

01 
the highest in point of intensity. .' This is but a preparation for further 
proof in the ninth book that the philosopher not only experiences p19asure, 
the truest and highest, but the most pleasure. 
In the eighth book a distinction is ,made between the necessary and 
unnecessary pleasures. The necessary pleasures are the simple desires, which 
demand satisfaction by our nature, cannot be put aside and when satisfied 
confer some benefit upon us. The unnecessary 8Jeasures are entirely the 
opposite. They can be repressed and should be. for they are contrary to our 
nature and when indulged do us harm. Let us make the distinction clear by 
using Plato's examples. A necessary pleasure is the eating of simple food, 
which produces health and strength in our bodies and without which we could 
scarcely carryon our work. The unnecessary pleasures of eating are those 
which go beyond the ordinar;y fare and not onl~r cause harm to the body, but 
also distract the soul in its pursuit of knowledge and virtue. 
The distinction is noteworthy for its more moderate view of the 
-
physical pleasures. Plato acknowledges that smme physical pleasures are de-
manderi by our nature and are. therefore, good for us. The necessary 
pleasures, then. are to be considered a part of the good life. which is the I 
goal of all men's desires. 
V:e approach now the more lengthy discu ssion of pleasure in the 
. 
ninth book. The question broached in the first book is again taken up. Who 
is the happier, the good man or the bad? To decide the question properly we 
must consider that there are three parts in the soul and a pleasure proper to 
each. Corresponding to each of these three parts and their distinctive 

There being, then, three kinds of pleasure, the rleasure 
of that part of the S01l1 v;hereb~' we learn is the sweetest, 
and the life 0:::' the man in whom that part don'.inates is 
the most plen.surable. 3 
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The second place falls to the lover of honor and to the lover of 
money and the physical p128.s11res is allotted9tire last place. 
There fo110'/[s then a discussion of the trueness of the pleasures of 
each life, but since it adds nothinc tc ,mat 1;,e halTe already considered we 
.. 
shall omit it. Plato's final words on t'1e ques+;ion are, however, an import-
ant completion of our problem: 
Then may Vie not confidently declare that in both the gain-
loving and the contentious part of our nature all the 
desires that wait upon lrnowledge and reason, and, pursuing 
their pleasures in conjunction ·-wi th them, te.ke only these 
pleasures which reason approves, will, since they follow 
truth, enjoy the truest pleasures, so far as that is 
pOdsi ble for them, ond also the plee.sures that are proper 
to them and their own, if for e
4
ver;ythins that which is best 
may be said to be most its own. 
In the Philebus we find much the same doctrine as has been expressec 
in the Republic. AlthouSh it may seem repetitious, a sur::unation of the con-
tAnts of the Philebus will be of confirr'latory value. 
The mixture of knowled:"e and pleasure ~'Jas det8rI:'ined as the good 
life for r.:.en. Each were then considered separately and in detail. The dia-
10{;u8 cone ludes ,vi th a final di scussion of the mixture. 
The good and perfect life demands a mixture of pleasure and • 
knovr1edGe, because either by itself would be acceptable to no one. Three 
3 Pl"'.to, Republic, II, translated by Paul Shorey. Loeb :lassieal Library, 
1 \',;m. Heineman, London, 1935, 583 a. 
Ll Ibid., 586 d. 
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.' thinGs :must be added to make this mixture perfect, namely, truth, measure and 
proportion, and c eauty, since beauty is an offspring of measure and propor-
tion. All three Might well be considered the cause of the goodness of the 
mixture, and hence a.re to be rated first in the scale of the good. Knowledge 
4- OIl; 
since it is most akin to measure and proportion, beauty and truth, must fol-
low after in the next place. The last plac'3 falls to the pure pleasures 
alo!"_;; v'fith the necessary pleasures join3d to hettlth and self-restraint and 
without which our natura is unable to exist. The intense and greatest 
pleasures, which are the excessive physical enjoJ~ents, are accounted of no 
value, because they create hindrances and disturbances to the good and 
happiest life. Hence they are excluded. 
Our steps lead us finally to the Laws. This is the :nature product 
of Plato';:, old age, rich with experience and a lifetime of thought. Hare, if 
anywhere, we should expect to find a definite, sane and well-balanced 
philosophy of life. It is noteworthy, then, to discover the Laws in accord-
with the doctrine we have seen ex~ressed in Plato's earlier dialogues. If 
there is anything new, it is 
an even fuller reconciliation to pleasure and a fuller 
incorporation of it as a nec~ssary and valuable 
ingredient of the good life./ 
The subject of pleasure is especially connected with the regulation 
of education. It is important to train the youth in the proper choice of 
pleasures, for 'whoever is bIlought up 
5 Grube, 82. 
I 
unacquainted wi tr. the greatesat pleasure and unused to 
endure ~id ti~e temptations oC)f pleasure and is not 
disciplined to refrain from a A 11 thing s6avil, the sweet feeling of pleasure will over-::-come ••• 
~~ducation must begin with the proper tr-::-aining of the pleasure-instinct, for 
virtue and vice manifest themselves to child"I-et. under the gtdse of pleasure 
ard pain. If the young are taught to l-Love the proper pleasures consonant 
voith virtue, when they do attain knowleedge, they will find their souls in 
• 
harmony wi th reason, and thi s harmony i.i s virtue. 
It should, moreover, be an of "'_'fense ·worthy of the severest punish-
ment to assert that wicked men lead pIe easant lives. We must not admit that 
there are two separate lives, the right;:;eous and the pleasant, fer no one 
would choose any life devoid of pleasur~e. According to the judgment of the 
just me.n the righteous life is the most;:; pleasant. Justice and pleasure are 
inseparable companions ar..d fom the hapopiest and holiest life. This judg-
ment coming from a better soul must be true. 
There remains but one sectionul in the fifth book to be considered. 
It is important in so far as it recalls; again the use of the calculus 
already noted in the Protagoras. 
Pleasures and pains and desir-as are a part of human 
nature, and on then: every mar-tal being must of 
necessity hang and depend vrit:~h the most eager interest. 
iilld therefore, we must praisee the noblest life, not 
only as the fairest in a::-pear·-ance, but, if a man ,viII 
only taste and not as in the days of youth run away to 
6 Plato, The Dialogues of Plato, V, traLnslated by B. Jowett. Oxford 
University Press, Humphrey Milford, 19:1 24, 114 e. 
I 
.' another, he will find that this nobler life surpasses also 
in the very thing which all of us desire, I me~ in having 
the breatest pleasure and the least of pain durin~ the 
whole of life. 7 
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V.e must balance pleasure with pleesure and pain wi th pain in the comparison 
. 
of lives, for all the lives of men are chose~hy re~son of pleasure and pain. 
If we find El. me.n choosing a life, which is less pleasant than another we can 
sa:/ only that the choice is made through ignorance and inexperience • 
• 
':'Ie may say that there are four lives, the temperate, the rational, 
the courageous and the hee.l thful to which are opposed the intemperate, the 
foolish, the cowardly and the diseased lives. Judging the one class against 
the Dther merely on the basis of pleasure we are forced to acmit that the 
temperate, wise, courageous and heal thy are far superior to their opposites. 
And thus we must conclude that 
generally speaking, that which has any virtue, whether of 
body or soul, is pleasanter than the vicious life and far 
superior in beauty, rectitude, excellence, goodness and 
reputation, and causes him who lives gccordingly to be 
infinitely happier than the opposite. 
From beginning to end Plato was ever opposed to a life dominated by 
pleasure, a life which has no other goal but pleasure. The Gorgias and 
Phaedo are stern outbursts of his righteous indignation and well represent 
his fervid opposition to the doctrine which reduced our life to a mere 
grovelling for the intense physical pleasnres. 
~ Ibid., 732 o. 
Ibid., 734 e. 
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.' Pluto's severity, hOl'ITever, did not prevent him from seeing the 
fundamental t ruth which Hedonism exaggerated. Pleasure 'we must have in our 
lives, for it is rooted in our very nature to strive for happiness, and 
pleasure is a part of happiness. Our mistake,lies in this, that we wrongly 
... ., 
invert the proposition that the good life is always pleasant into the dogma 
that pleasure is the good, which should permeate and guide our life. It is 
the duty of education to correct our false opi~on and show us in what the 
good life consists. 
The well-ordered life of the philosopher, guided by reason and 
knowledge, is the noblest life. The philosopher reaches up into the abso-
lute a.'1d studies the nature of things, because our nature will be developed 
and perfected only when we live in conformity with the absolute values of 
truth, beauty and goodness. 
Bveryone, however, cannot be expected to have the mind of the 
philosopher, and the young must reach the philosopher's perfection by slow_ 
stages. For these people pleasure may be assumed as the standard of conduct, 
but they must be made to realize that even then their choice of pleasures 
should be based upon knowledge. To live a life of riotous pleasure-seeking I 
is V'Trong, because it is chosen in ignorance of the truest g,nd lasting 
pleasures. Their choice of pleasures is a short-sighted calculation, and 
they never attain the happy life for which they are seeking. They must be 
instructed and trained to make the proper caloulations for themselves, or 
failing that, to trust the calculations of the philosopher, who bases his 
life upon a genuine knowledge of the good. }:t'ollowing the footsteps of the 
philosopher they wi 11 lead the good life and "vill come to taste its true 
pleasures, so that the false and deceitful pleasures can never tempt them 
to turn aside. 
68 
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